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Union financial measures do not tell us what 
unions are for, but they are a key indicator 
of the viability of the union movement. The 
Webbs, in their classic 1907 study, were 
probably the first to lay this out. They talked 
about the ‘new model’ unions of the 1840s 
as the first robust and permanent union 
organisations in the UK, based on securing 
financial viability and supported by clear 
rules and responsibilities. It was based on 
negotiated agreements rather than repeated 
strikes, more centralised control over 
collective action, and the presence of some 
full time officials. Secure revenues, some 
financial reserves and rules over expenditure 
were seen as necessary conditions to secure 
both the social and economic objectives of 
collective organisation. Broadly followed 
subsequently by the general unions, these 
principles provided an organisational model 
adopted by most major unions in the UK. 
This model required that income balanced 
expenditure in the long term but exceeded it in the 
medium term to provide some buffer of funds to 
cover expenditure spikes, such as the funding of 
strike action. Most income came from membership 
subscriptions. Expenditures included the costs of 
collective organisation plus benefits for members, 
particularly before the establishment of the welfare 
state. The surplus of income over expenditure in 
good years went into bonds and buildings, and in 
bad years funded the costs of industrial action.
By the 1930s at the latest, the model was 
in trouble. The reason was that income from 
members was not in the aggregate keeping pace 
with expenditure and the shortfall was being 
covered by use of returns on assets or – worse 
– sales of assets. The problem was not primarily 
membership, although this dipped during the great 
depression, but the proportion of members’ income 
taken as subscriptions. 
Let’s illustrate this by looking at the ‘golden 
age’ of union membership from 1950 to 1979. 
Union membership increased every year and, on 
average, income was approximately 14% greater 
than expenditure. But income from members 
averaged 97% of expenditure and across the 
period union reserves crashed as they were used 
to fund operating expenditures. In 1950, the union 
movement as a whole had about 4.5 years’ of 
expenditure in reserves; by 1979, it was under 1.5.
Across the whole period, union subscriptions in 
the aggregate never exceeded half of one per cent 
of average earnings in real terms.
The ‘new model’ business model was thus not as 
robust as it had seemed. In the 1970s, one of the 
most successful decades for the union movement 
in terms of membership growth, in real terms, 
union net worth (funds) collapsed and income 
stagnated. Real expenditure rose at its fastest post- 
war rate. The inflation that was driving white collar 
workers into unions, as George Bain argued, was 
also causing a collapse in real asset prices and 
stagnation in real earnings, both of which damaged 
union finances. Moreover, the money that was 
left was concentrated in manual unions that were 
not expanding fast, not in white collar ones that 
were. Some of the latter were effectively collective 
action Ponzi schemes that could only survive if 
membership growth continued. When winter came 
in 1979, the union movement had only summer 
clothes.
The purpose of this short paper is threefold. First 
we ask, what are the underlying properties of the 
dominant organisational model that looks to be in 
some trouble, and what do they imply? Second, we 
look at options for thinking about how unions might 
change their organisational models. We conclude 
by looking at what this might imply.
INTRODUCTION
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WHAT DO UNIONS DO?
The dominant organisational model for 
unions in the UK has entailed the provision 
of collective bargaining based on the 
organisation of collective action. Historically, 
this has dominated over participation, 
benefit provision or administration of state 
social security, all of which have featured 
in other countries. To make this work, the 
successful union has amassed members 
and then negotiated with employers; this 
has been more common than the reverse. 
Bargaining and individual representation for 
members (for which they pay subscriptions) 
usually depends on collective agreements, 
which in turn generate resources for union 
organisation (facilities and time off for union 
lay representative to perform union duties, 
check-off, procedure agreements) for which, 
ultimately, employers pay. We term the 
latter ‘off balance sheet’ resources, on the 
basis that they appear on neither the union’s 
nor the employer’s accounts. It’s difficult 
to estimate the total value of off balance 
sheet resources, but we argue they are both 
considerable and vital for many unions where 
lay representation is important.
Generically, this view places unions in the broader 
category of intermediary organisations that sit 
between two markets. Consider the analogy of a 
newspaper. The newspaper needs readers to get 
advertisers and advertisers to keep the cost down 
for readers. Historically, the UK union has needed 
members to get recognition from employers and 
recognition to keep members.
Let’s pursue the analogy a little further. Some 
newspapers are free. The advertising pays for 
everything. In the UK, Metro is an example; so 
is the Evening Standard. Some are expensive, 
and don’t have a lot of advertising, such as the 
FT and Economist. The free ones don’t employ a 
lot of journalists and the expensive ones do. The 
free ones have high readership (or at least print 
a lot of copies) and the expensive ones don’t. So 
let’s imagine two hypothetical unions, of identical 
size and with the same number of collective 
agreements with employers.
• Union A relies entirely on full time officers 
to provide membership services. It has high 
costs and high subscriptions. There is a clear 
distinction between its democratic structures, 
run by members, and its operations, run by 
employees of the union.
• Union B relies almost exclusively on networks 
of lay representatives supported by facilities 
agreements. It has much lower costs and 
probably lower subscriptions. The democratic 
and operational activities in the union are likely 
to be member controlled.
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Unions A and B have both made choices which 
have very different risk outcomes. Their financial 
structures and issues will differ markedly. Probably, 
most UK unions are somewhere in between, so 
both ‘markets’ – employers and members - are 
very important. An example close to union ‘A’ 
would be the Inland Revenue Staff Federation in 
the 1980s, who raised membership income to fund 
an increase in full time officials during the civil 
service disputes, because generating high levels 
of membership activism proved hard. An example 
close to union ‘B’ would be the car industry in the 
1970s, with heavy reliance by several unions on 
shop stewards, many of whom were full time. A 
final point about this; newspapers are ancestors 
of the modern ‘platform’ business that succeeds 
by providing connections between independent 
groups. A few newspapers are evolving into 
platforms; we explore the implications for unions in 
the next section.
Before that we need to look at a second property 
of the dominant model in UK unions. This is the 
tendency for expenditure to rise faster than income 
in the long term, as we described above.
Economists, notably William Baumol, call this 
the ‘cost disease’. It doesn’t come across as an 
attractive term, so let’s look at what they mean. It 
is essentially an argument about productivity and 
technology. In some service industries, rapid and 
sustained productivity improvements are difficult 
to achieve, costs rise inexorably and so do prices, 
so people need to spend a greater part of their 
income on such services. Baumol’s own examples 
are education, health care and the arts. Consider 
the relative prices of a computer and an opera 
ticket since 1980. In 1980, you could buy several 
opera tickets for the price of a computer, and now 
the reverse is the case. In computers, technological 
advances generating massive improvements in 
productivity cause real costs to fall, but if you cut 
the costs of an opera you cut the quality too. Opera 
companies try to mitigate the cost problems by 
seeking state sponsorship and philanthropy. But 
they also have to try to convince consumers that 
higher prices are worth it.
Since unions suffer similarly from cost disease 
problems – and there are no obvious sources 
of massive labour productivity increases in the 
provision of collective action under the existing 
organisational model – we might ask what the 
implications are here. The first option is to raise 
the price to members. Historically this has proved 
difficult in real terms, but UK union subscriptions 
are low by international standards as a percentage 
of earnings. The standard explanation has been 
inter-union competition. Inter-union competition 
is probably not what it was, given the declining 
number of unions, but the real competition is 
probably non-membership. The second is to 
try to find external subsidy for the provision of 
collective action; this probably involves addressing 
the content of industrial relations legislation. The 
third and most radical approach is to address the 
underlying organisational model.
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A NEW MODEL?
We noted that productivity and technology are 
at the heart of the cost disease model and 
we noted that unions have some similarities 
to platform businesses. In this section, we 
look at some of the properties of platform 
businesses and ask if there is anything that 
could be borrowed or adapted to solve the cost 
disease problem in UK unions. 
A business model is essentially a promise of future 
revenue that has three things in it:
1. A reason why people should want to engage 
with the organisation (the ‘value proposition’)
2. A plan to turn this into revenue.
3. A cost model. Bluntly, it says why revenue will 
fly ahead of costs. 3. makes no sense without 2.
In the dot.com boom, the business model often 
involved the establishment of a platform to connect 
companies with customers via an online network. 
Access to the platform was typically free (and 
usually enabled via an ‘app’), but the anticipated 
scale effects of the network provided the promise of 
future revenue which encouraged investors to put 
their money into businesses that were losing it.
We all know the names of the most successful 
ones – Amazon, eBay, Uber, Airbnb – and if you 
put money in you probably got a lot out. There are 
thousands of others we don’t recognise for good 
reasons. Here are four things the successful ones 
do. We’ll just use two examples.
1. They use spare capacity at marginal cost. Uber 
uses idle cars and Airbnb empty rooms.
2. They thus have very low fixed costs. Uber owns 
no cars and Airbnb owns no hotel rooms.
3. They generate huge network effects. 
Specifically, the more cars on the road the more 
customers for Uber, the more rooms available, 
the more buyers for Airbnb.
4. They create data bases. Both companies know 
more about their suppliers and customers than 
anyone else.
We know that unions can do some or all of these 
things, not least because some examples already 
exist. First, resources generated at marginal cost 
are mainly those we have described as ‘off balance 
sheet’. They arise from the interaction between 
facilities clauses for union activity in collective 
agreements and the willingness and opportunity 
of members to engage in activism. Where 
subscription income trails operating expenditure, 
unions can close the gap by applying the decision 
rule that anything that could go off the balance 
sheet should do so.
Unions already make use of technology to 
communicate and coordinate action. There is a 
growing academic literature on this, particularly 
from USA, where unionisation is low but social 
media use is very high. There is a smartphone 
app with a chat interface developed for Walmart 
workers now used on license in several unions. 
This exploits network effects – the more app users, 
the better. In some cases, such as the recent 
teachers’ strike in West Virginia, social media 
use was initiated by members and adopted by the 
union. There is a clear role for union recruitment 
too; we would argue it is far more cost effective 
for unions to attempt to be service providers for 
existing self-organised social media groups than 
recruiting individual workers in pre-recognition 
situations. In the language of ‘platforms’, unions 
become ‘complementors’ facilitating exiting  
user groups.
The key to exploiting network effects is for a 
platform to attract as many users on the one 
hand and providers on the other, and they do it by 
removing price barriers. At a time when ‘never 
membership’ – the proportion of workers who have 
never been in unions – on the one hand and the 
percentage of non-union establishments on the 
other are both at historic highs in the UK, a strategy 
of growing the union platform network is at least 
worth examination. The price barrier for employers 
has already fallen as the union wage premium has 
shrunk. A union platform strategy needs to look at 
subscriptions.
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Recall the historic costs disease problem; 
subscription income has not for the best part of 
a century covered total expenditure and since the 
end of WW2 reserves as a multiple of expenditure 
have fallen from nearly 5 to under 1; in 2017 
the movement in the aggregate had 10 months 
expenditure in reserve. Solving the cost disease 
problem involves the following options. They may be 
very difficult to reconcile.
1. The core of the subscription shortfall problem 
is not profligate expenditure but the very low- 
by international standards- percentage of 
members’ earning taken as subscriptions. So, 
strategy 1 is to test out the price elasticity of 
demand for union membership by a concerted 
rise in real subscriptions. The bet would be 
more income would be generated than lost 
through membership turnover. There is a 
long list of problems here, but the two most 
formidable practical ones might be, first, co-
ordinating action across unions and, second, 
getting anything through any conference.
2. The second generic option is diversification of 
revenue streams. In 2017, subscription revenue 
was about 70% of total revenue. This would be 
regarded as very risky if the union movement 
was looked at as a business, since erosion 
or disruption of the single revenue source 
becomes life-threatening, particularly where 
reserves are low.
One reason why these options might be difficult 
to run together is that the standard platform 
response here would be, first, to give the app away 
(i.e. offer union membership for free – as happens 
for new entrants to teaching) and use the growth 
in membership to construct data sets about 
organisations, skills, labour market dynamics and 
employee attitudes and preferences that could 
then be used to enhance services to members 
and, perhaps, commercially (i.e. advertising). 
Union membership would then move from the 
current, essentially insurance, model where the 
subscription buys access to a variety of services, to 
transactional, where members would buy services 
through the app.
Finally, we need to address the centrality of 
collective bargaining for UK unions. The provision 
of collective representation has been at the heart 
of the union offering since the new model unions 
were founded. It has nearly always been based 
on gaining recognition from employers for the 
right collectively to represent a given group of 
workers, and the resultant agreements are the 
engines for both on balance sheet resources 
(subscriptions) and off balance sheet resources (lay 
representation). Before the new models, unions 
would set a price for labour and strike if necessary 
until the employer conceded.
Collective bargaining has generated enormous 
benefits for union members, but it does have the 
disadvantage of making the union’s resources 
dependent on continued employer willingness to 
sustain the agreement. Again, let us illustrate the 
issues with a hypothetical union ‘A’ and ‘B’.
• Union A has a comprehensive collective 
agreement with one employer, who employs 
all union members. The agreement is 
comprehensive and generates a large set of 
union facilities.
• Union B has a large set of collective  
agreements with diverse employers in different 
sectors, who do not have common interests. 
Again, the agreements generate large amounts 
of union resource.
Union A is likely to have a much more efficient 
cost structure, but it is very vulnerable to changes 
in employer policy. Union B has uncorrelated 
revenue streams, and is more efficient in portfolio 
terms; specifically, it generates the same level of 
revenue at a lower level of risk. At worst, union ‘A’ 
may evolve a somewhat feudal mutually dependent 
relationship with its single employer.
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We would argue that union A has strong business 
incentives to diversify away from collective 
bargaining rights as the underpinning for all 
revenues. The standard platform response here 
would be the construction and use of membership 
databases that could be used for revenue 
generation. These might include:
• Aggregating membership data to feedback 
information to members, for example on wage 
rates or job opportunities;
• Selling advertising based on data analytics;
• Using social media to connect members with 
each other.
These might support the development of an array 
of additional services to members on the basis of 
which revenues are generated.
This short paper started with the argument 
that British unions suffer from the cost 
disease problem. They are not alone – most 
arts and health organisations are affected. 
Cost disease sectors have to take up a greater 
proportion of consumer expenditure over time 
to survive, unless they get external subsidy. 
If they cannot, they must apply technology to 
reduce costs. So, as the costs of going to an 
opera escalate, we buy CDs then we stream. 
Unions are intermediate organisations between 
employers and members, so the obvious 
technologies to exploit systematically are platform 
technologies. In the second, more speculative, part 
of the paper, we have tried to show how this might 
work. We would say very firmly that it is likely to 
work in different ways for different unions.
One alternative to not exploiting platform 
technology is to raise the price of union 
membership; we think this is risky and difficult to 
implement across the board. A second option is 
to do nothing. After all, one might argue, the cost 
disease problem has been around for a hundred 
years and unions are still here. The analogy we 
would deploy here is that jumping off a skyscraper 
probably feels OK for most of the trip. We might be 
around the second floor.
CONCLUSION
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